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The military spends resources ensuring individual warfighter equipment is 
technologically advanced and operationally effective/suitable. Certain types of warfighter 
equipment, specifically durable goods, have long service lives; therefore, services cannot 
afford to replace all warfighter equipment when advances in capability or weight 
reduction are achieved. However, like pre-positioned stocks of heavy combat equipment, 
having stocks of modern warfighter equipment in a non-contingent environment ready for 
early deployers ensures readiness and buys time for industrial base ramp-up. 
The Deployer Equipment Bundle (DEB) concept would outfit early deploying 
brigade combat teams (BCTs) to the next major contingency with the most modern, 
lifesaving equipment available, providing sufficient buffer stock to enable the industrial 
base to ramp up to full capacity. This concept procures organizational clothing and 
individual protective equipment (OCIE) and personal protective equipment (PPE) for 
immediate capability needs and includes flame-resistant (FR) uniforms. The DEB 
concept increases flexibility while reducing operational risks to the Army. We found that 
an effective implementation of a DEB concept should leverage the best practices of the 
Army Rapid Field Initiative (RFI) operations, Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) 
operations, and United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment 
(ICCE) operations. In addition, our research identified the barriers and challenges to the 
acceptance of the DEB concept: aversion to change, ignorance to new concepts, Army 
culture, and trust.   
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On December 8, 2004, while attending a town hall meeting with Soldiers at Camp 
Buehring, Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked a question 
regarding the lack of up-armor on military vehicles. He responded, “As you know, you 
go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have 
at a later time” (Kristol, 2004, Introduction). Rumsfeld’s statement prompted senior 
leaders to look inward and determine what steps were required to rectify Army materiel 
capability gaps such as up-armor and antiquated critical combat equipment (CCE).   
The United States Army (USA) spends a substantial amount of resources ensuring 
that individual warfighting equipment is technologically advanced and rigorously tested 
for combat effectiveness and suitability. Warfighter critical combat equipment has an 
extended life cycle, meaning it lasts a long time. The managerial decisions regarding 
procurement, issuing, and sustainment create long-lasting retained effects on readiness. 
The Army cannot afford to replace all warfighter equipment when advances in capability 
or weight reduction are achieved. As with pre-positioned stock of heavy combat 
equipment, providing stocks of modern warfighter equipment Class II (CLII), ready for 
issue to early deployers will save money, ensure readiness, and buy time for a ramp-up of 
the industrial base to provide for follow-on forces. This is all in keeping with General 
Mark A. Milley’s number one priority: “READINESS!” (Milley, 2015, p. 1). 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) recognized the need for an agile 
deployment equipping process that will keep the industrial base active to ensure that 
rapidly deploying troops receive the required combat equipment. The MCoE 
recommends that headquarters, department of the Army (HQDA G3/5/7), endorse the 
Deployer Equipment Bundle (DEB) concept in order to allow Program Executive Office 
(PEO) Soldier to procure and manage the necessary items (Sando, 2012). Edgewood 
Chemical Biological Center conducted a cost benefit analysis (CBA) in 2013 in support 
of this project. The DEB concept maintains a warm industrial base and significantly 
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reduces operational risk associated with either a surge or sustaining base (see Figure 1). 
The DEB concept is not currently adopted by necessary stakeholders. 
As displayed in Figure 1, under a warm industrial base designated with a blue 
line, the DEB concept is capable of fielding 15 brigade combat teams (BCT)s sooner than 
a surge or sustainment base fielding within the first two months due to proactive storage 
aspect.  Under a surge industrial base, designated with a red line, with fire retardant (FR) 
uniforms in production, it would take an additional five months after declaration for 
industry to ramp-up production and 12 months before they were capable of fielding a 
total of 15 BCTs.  Under a cold industrial base, designated with a yellow line, without FR 
uniforms in production, it would take an additional eight months after declaration for 
industry to commence production and 15 months before they were capable of fielding a 
total of 15 BCTs. As demonstrated in the shaded area of Figure 1, operational risk is 
significantly mitigated with a DEB concept, allowing faster fielding and a faster 
industrial base ramp-up.  
 
Figure 1.  Potential Operational Risk with Equipping Immediate Deployers 
Source: Project Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment 
(PM SPIE) (2013). 
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B. PURPOSE 
This project examines the challenges and barriers to acceptance for the United 
States Army implementing a DEB concept for organizational clothing and individual 
CCE. The DEB concept would be funded in a non-contingency environment with 
Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) base funding. The DEB concept is analyzed 
for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to identify advantages and 
disadvantages. Class II (CLII) materiel legacy operations for procurement, storage, and 
issuing from supply is analyzed. Army pre-positioned stock (APS) concept for Class VII 
(CLVII) is comparatively analyzed for parallel processes. Additionally, this research 
examines the United States United States Marine Corps (USMC) for comparison of how 
they operate their pre-positioned class II materiel equivalencies.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To identify DEB challenges and barriers to acceptance, our research examines the 
following questions: 
Primary Question:  What are the challenges and barriers to acceptance for the 
USA to adopt and implement the DEB concept for organizational clothing Class II 
materiel? 
Secondary Questions: 
1. What is the Army’s legacy operation for the procurement, storage and 
issuing of organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE)? What 
is the Army’s desired CCE readiness level? 
2. Using comparative analysis, what is the USMC organizational clothing 
equivalencies operation? Why does the Army pre-position heavy 
equipment and not FR Army Combat Uniform (ACU) and CCE items? 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the DEB concept? How 
does the DEB affect Commercial Industry’s ability to ramp-up to full-rate 
production? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This project reviewed a substantial amount of literature, to include applicable 
concept plans, memorandums, cost benefit analyses, organizational charts, standard 
operating procedures, and official government reports related to the DEB concept, pre-
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positioned stock, and CLII materiel/equivalencies. Data was analyzed through a 
comparative analysis of strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats (SWOT) as a way of 
identifying DEB challenges and barriers to acceptance. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
This document makes a number of assumptions when analyzing and comparing a 
DEB state to a status quo alternative. These assumptions are made to assist us in our 
research and analyses. The assumptions made are 
• In a non-wartime environment, PEO Soldier operates rapid fielding initiative 
(RFI) as a low-intensity operation dependent on fiscal resources directly 
proportional to the number of outside continental United States (OCONUS) 
mission-deployed Soldiers.  
• 15 BCTs is a reasonable number of planned first deployers in the event of one 
or more simultaneous major contingencies. 
• Fielded Soldier OCIE must be replaced at an annual 10% degradation due to 
wear and tear. 
F. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized into five separate chapters with supporting data, Figures 
as required.  
Chapter I introduces the DEB concept topic and provides a summary of purpose 
and methodologies. This chapter identifies the secondary research questions used to gain 
answers and ultimately address the primary research question: What are the challenges 
and barriers to acceptance for the USA to adopt and implement the DEB concept for 
organizational clothing Class II materiel? The chapter concludes with an outline of the 
thesis. 
Chapter II provides the background information about Organizational Clothing 
and Individual Equipment (OCIE). Specific areas of interest include current regulations 
governing OCIE activity, a summary of OCIE operations, and the Rapid Fielding 
Initiative (RFI) for contingency operations. OCIE is explored across the USA and the 
USMC as applicable. The purpose of this chapter is to capture a snapshot of status quo 
operations. 
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Chapter III provides a literature review of the documents defining Army pre-
positioned stock and the DEB concept in order to provide a context for later analysis.  
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the DEB concept. DEB is analyzed using the 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, 
Facilities, and Policy (DOTmLPF-P) template. Additionally, DEB is analyzed through 
the lens of a SWOT analysis. Next, we perform quantitative analysis to subjectively 
differentiate between a DEB and non-DEB state of operation. This chapter concludes 
with a sensitivity analysis of how evaluation criteria could be weighted differently to 
support a different outcome. 
Chapter V concludes the project with a summary of conclusions based on 
analyses from earlier chapters. Conclusions are tied to the content in the previous 
chapters and inferences from analyses. Ideas and opportunities not reviewed in this 
project are provided as future research areas. Chapter V ends with our closing 








This chapter provides insight on the regulation requirements for both the U.S. 
Army’s organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) and the USMC’s 
individual clothing and combat equipment (ICCE) operations. Additionally, this chapter 
provides a preliminary comparative analysis of the USMC ICCE operations to the U.S. 
Army’s central issuing facility (CIF) and RFI operations in an attempt to highlight 
differences that may be leveraged and discussed in Chapter IV.  
The USMC designates Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment as two 
separate entities of which both are issued to a Marine upon initial entry into service and is 
required to be maintained throughout the entirety of a Marine’s service. Individual 
clothing articles consist of items such as a Marine’s blouse, trousers, belt, boots and other 
items (see Table 1). Combat equipment, typically issued for the duration of a Marine’s 
tour on a particular duty station, consists of combat equipment such as helmets, modular 
tactical vests (see Figure 2), the family of load bearing equipment (see Figure 3), and 
other similar items (see Table 2).   
8 
Table 1.   List of United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing Issue. 










Figure 2.  Modular Tactical Vests. Source: Modular Tactical Vest (n.d.). 
 
Figure 3.  List of United States Marine Corps Individual Combat Equipment. 
Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.).  
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Table 2.   List of USMC Combat Equipment.  
Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.). 
 
 
For the U.S. Army, organizational clothing and equipment is worn in both combat 
and training environments. Like the USMC, the U.S. Army has two types of Soldier 
equipment: individual and organizational. Individual equipment, issued to Soldiers upon 
their entry into the U.S. Army, consists of basic items required for a Soldier to conduct 
daily business. These items include, dress blues, duffel bag, combat boots, patrol cap, 
operational camouflage pattern (OCP) Army combat uniform (non-FR), and a myriad of 
other items (see Figure 4 for examples of individual clothing). Organizational clothing 
items are issued on a loan basis via installation central issuing facilities to Soldiers while 
assigned to their respective home station installations. These organizational items 
include, laundry bags, improved outer tactical vest [IOTV], elbow/knee pads, hydration 
system, rucksack, load carrier vests, assault pack, combat helmet, and other equipment 
(see Figure 5).  
11 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Army Individual Clothing. Source: Central Issue Facility Torii Station (n.d.). 
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Figure 5.  U.S. Army Organizational Clothing. Source: Central Issue Facility Torii Station (n.d.). 
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT 
Whether in a garrison, training, or combat environment, the armed forces deems 
organizational clothing and individual equipment as CCE and personal protective 
equipment (PPE).   
1. Service Regulations 
Service regulations are documents defined in explicit detail, the guidance and 
policies of which service members are required to follow. 
a. United States Marine Corps 
The USMC uses only one logistical strategy for ICCE operations regardless of the 
operational environment that exists. That guidance is specified in USMC Corps Order 
(MCO) 4400.201 (DON USMC, 2016). Additionally, the USMC guidance for long-term 
ICCE storage is specified in MCO 4400.196A (DON USMC, 2015). 
MCO 4400.201-V13, Individual Clothing, Flags, personal Effects, “and the 
Consolidated Storage Program, [provides] guidance for the administration and 
management of individual clothing, flags, personal effects, and [storage]”(DON USMC, 
2016, p. 1-2) Additionally, it provides “guidance for the governing, construct, roles and 
responsibilities, and integration across the USMC for the management of the CSP  
[which] consists of the individual issue and unit issues facilities” (DON USMC, 2016, pp. 
1-14, 9-2). MCO 4400.201-V13 provides USMC commanders the specifics of Marine 
clothing allowances; ICE (Individual Combat Equipment) record keeping; sources of 
supply, retention, recovery, and replacement of individual clothing; and guidance to the 
consolidated storage point on “the centralized inventory management of [infantry combat 
equipment]” (DON USMC, 2016, p. 1-8). 
MCO 4400.196A, the intent of this order is to “provide broad guidance and 
responsibilities for centralized management of ICCE, and operation and management of 
[IIFs and UIFs]” (DON USMC, 2015, p.1). Additionally, the order is promotes 
operational management and equipment readiness of CSPs through asset management, 
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equipment accountability, and optimization of inventory. Additionally, it provides 
guidance on methods of decreasing total support costs for life cycle management of CSP 
inventory. 
MCO 4400.150 provides guidance and policy to ensure standardization of 
consumer-level supply operations regardless of the environment. This policy ensures that 
“processes and procedures are in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) 
regulations for supply and financial management” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 4). MCO 
4400.150 concentrates and governs supply operations at the unit level of inventory. 
b. United States Army Regulations 
OCIE class II operations are managed within three separate levels of Army 
logistics: strategic, operational, and tactical. Each level navigates a myriad of Army 
regulations that crisscross a wide logistical OCIE framework. All levels tie one regulation 
to another regulation at a separate, yet vital, level of the OCIE framework. 
Majors Weestrand and Gilbert (2015) state, “Theater level sustainment operations 
aims at providing effective warfighter support with greater efficiency linking the strategic 
industrial base to tactical formations, specifically by optimizing theater level OCIE 
inventory and processes” (Weestrand & Gilbert, 2015, p. 16). For example, through 
implementation of a Lean Six Sigma (LSS) strategy, the 21st Theater Sustainment 
Command, synchronizing with the LSS project team members, reallocated excess OCIE 
inventory worth over $14 Million to “six different installations” (Weestrand & Gilbert, 
2015, p. 19). According to Weestrand and Gilbert, “The redistribution of [theater level] 
OCIE stocks offset future requirements at these installations, saving the United States 
Army future dollars spent” (Weestrand & Gilbert, 2015, p. 19). 
(1) Strategic Level Regulations 
AR 710-2, Policy for Supply Operations below the National Level (DOA, 2008b), 
provides guidance during both “peace and war for the supply management and operations 
of Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), 
and other [Materiel Management Centers (MMCs)] above division and below division, 
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[specifically stating, the process requirements for managing equipment stored at] direct, 
general, or installation Supply Support Activities for issue to a customer (SSAs)” (DOA, 
2008b, pp. 1, 13). Additionally, AR 710-2 instructs the deputy  chief of staff army 
logistics (G4) to establish an Army supply policy, evaluate requests for additional 
procedural publication, deviation from existing procedural publication, review and 
approve implementation of existing procedural publications (DOA, 2008b). 
AR 740-1, Logistics: Storage and Supply Activity Operations, provides guidance 
for the management of materiel storage and supply operations. Specifically it instructs the 
Deputy chief of staff G4 and subordinate commands to develop and submit concepts and 
long range plans for future worldwide storage and maintenance of Army Pre-positioned 
stocks (described in greater detail in Chapter IV), equipment storage space requirements, 
justification for new facilities storage requirements, quality control (QC), and the reliable 
management of supplies and equipment in support of the Army’s supply distribution 
system (DOA, 2008c). Lastly, AR 740-1 provides guidance for the identification, control, 
and utilization of shelf-life OCIE items (DOA, 2008c).   
(2) Operational Level Regulations 
Section II, Chapter 10 of the Common Table of Allowances (CTA) 50–900 
authorizes a central issuing facility’s to requisition, distribute, care for, replace, account 
for, secure, stock, mark, inspect, inventory, recover, and dispose of OCIE. (Fort Carson 
Logistics Readiness Center, 2016). There is a central issuing facility located on nearly all 
Army installations. 
Common Table of Allowances 50-900, Clothing and Individual Equipment, 
provides guidance for the issuance of OCIE in specific climate zones, mission 
requirements, and military occupational specialties. CTA 50-900 states that in 
conjunction with CTA 8-100 and 50-970, “it is the only department of the Army (DOA) 
authorization document [used] for individual and organizational clothing and equipment.” 
(DOA, 2008a, p. 1). CTA 50-970 additionally provides an authorization document for 
OCIE according to the provisions of Army Regulation 71-32 and 700-84 (DOA, 
2008a, p. 1).   
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AR 71-32 governs that CTA 50-970, Expendable/Durable Items (except medical, 
ammunition, repair parts, and heraldic items), provide policies and guidance for a 
“flexible basis of issue, which may be used to acquire selected items of 
expendable/durable equipment and provides guidance for determining initial issue and 
stockage levels of expendable/durable items required to accomplish their mission” (DOA, 
2005, p. 1). As an example, the computation in Figure 6 reflects the quantity required for 
a force of 1,500 personnel for a three-month period using a basis of issue 1 per 100 
individuals per month.  
1500  Number of personnel 
x 3  Number of months 
 
 4500  Total personnel months 
 / 100 Personnel factor 
 
   45  
 x .1 Quantity Factor 
 
 4.5  Items required for stockage level 
Figure 6.  Computation for 1,500 Personnel over a Three-Month Period. Adapted 
from DOA (2005, p. 1). 
Army Regulation 71-32, Force Development and Documentation provides guidance to 
the Deputy chief of staff G4 and army procurement and resources deputy chief of staff 
(G8) on the development “and documentation of [Army force structure programs, force 
accounting], personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations, [and associated 
force management activities]” (DOA, 2013b, p. 1). The force management system is the 
information technology system for all basis of issue plans required for the planning and 
programing of acquisition requirements. By identifying and documenting both personnel 
and equipment requirements, basis of issue plans are developed for new or improved 
items of equipment and materiel development (DOA, 2008a). 
Army Regulation 700-84, Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing provides guidance 
for the “issue and sale of personal clothing” (DOA, 2014b, p. 5). Specifically, it directs 
the deputy chief of staff G4 and the Army Materiel Command to make periodic 
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inspections to the Army Military Clothing Store to ensure compliance with established 
policies and procedures. Lastly, Army Regulation 700-84 directs unit commanders to 
ensure that only a Soldiers OCIE listed in the CTA 50-900 are inventoried and inspected 
and then subsequently entered on their personal clothing records (DOA, 2014b).  
Forces Command Regulation 700-2, FORSCOM Standing Logistics Instructions 
delineates the logistical policies, movement planning methods, support responsibilities, 
pre-mobilization/deployment stockage and storage of CTA items of deployable units 
within the U.S. Army Forces Command. Additionally, Forces Command Regulation 700-
2 dictates when “contingency plan implementation requires [the] use of Army Pre-
positioned stocks for materiel sustainment support” (DOA, 1999, p. 5). 
PM SPIE standard operating procedure outlines policies for operations conducted 
to support PM SPIE, the Logistics Management Directorate, the Fielding and New 
Equipment Training Operations, Materiel Readiness Operations. The PM SPIE standard 
operating procedure (SOP) provides guidance to stakeholders on the proper fielding of 
Class II and protective clothing and individual equipment (DOA, 2015b). 
(3) Tactical Level Regulations 
Army Regulation 735-5, Property Accountability, provides guidance for the 
accounting of U.S. Army property outlining and standardizing requirements and 
procedures. Specifically, Army Regulation 735-5 establishes “guidelines for maintaining 
the command supply discipline program, addressing supervisory and/or managerial 
responsibilities within the supply system” (DOA, 2013c, p. 1). Furthermore, Army 
Regulation 735-5 provides brigade, battalion, and company commander’s oversight 
management designating that commanders at all levels comply with policies set forth 
within the regulation (DOA, 2013c).   
2. Operations 
To understand Army OCIE operations and whether the DEB concept is accepted, 
a comparative analysis between the USMC and Army is presented in Chapter IV. 
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Currently, the USMC is the only organization (non-Army) that closely resembles the 
Army’s mission requirements and equipment types.  
a. USMC Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment (ICCE) Operations 
Within the headquarters element, there are four separate line organizations, each 
handling a separate form of logistics for the USMC. The line organization that 
specifically manages ICE, is the Logistics Services Management Center (LSMC) see 
Figure 7. The LSMC states they are tasked to “monitor critical USMC ground equipment 
supply chain activities; plans, manages, executes, and integrates supply chain 
improvements; and manage multiple critical logistics programs to ensure effective and 
efficient support to the warfighter” (USMC, 2014, p. 3). Under LSMC there are 
strategically located centrally managed logistics and sustainment support centers see 
Figure 8. Nested under those strategically located support centers are the Consolidated 
Storage Program offices which manage individual and unit combat equipment.  
 
Figure 7.  Marine Corps Logistics Command Structure. Source: Marine Corps 
Logistics Command (2016). 
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Figure 8.  Logistics Services Management Centers around the Globe. Source: 
Janczak (2014). 
In 2011, Consolidated Storage Program offices (central issuing facilities, and the 
consolidated storage facility) transitioned to individual issue facilities and unit issue 
facilities under the Consolidated Storage Program concept, illustrated in Figure 9 (DON 
USMC, 2011). Both individual issue facilities and unit issue facilities are tasked “to 
manage the issue, recovery, storage, and sustainment of [ICCE inventory such as] 
infantry combat equipment; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and [enhanced 
conventional weapons (CBRNE) equipment; and] special training allowance pool 
(STAP) equipment, to individual Marines, [unit commanders], and higher/adjacent 




Figure 9.  Consolidated Storage Program Concept. Source: DON USMC (2011). 
 
Figure 10.  Individual Combat Clothing and Equipment Examples. Source: 
DON USMC (2011). 
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The “Consolidated Storage Program [utilizes the] Asset Visibility Capability 
(AVC) [program] to individually track and account for all serialized items [and the] shelf 
life of perishable [CBRNE inventory across the network] of Consolidated Storage 
Program [locations] ((DON USMC, 2011, p. 46). The USMC considers the AVC 
program to be “the single most critical tool [that the USMC can utilize to] ensure 
Warfighters have what they need when they need it” (DON USMC, 2011, p. 43). 
Additionally, the USMC requires that the AVC program provide the total life cycle 
management (TLCM) data when “making [future] critical fielding and replenishment 
decisions” (DON USMC, 2011, p. 43). The USMC does not feel that the Consolidated 
Storage Program could “function without a robust and capable AVC” (DON USMC, 
2011, p. 43). 
The Consolidated Storage Program classifies inventory into two categories: 
expendable and consumable (DON USMC, 2015). Any ICCE inventory deemed non-
expendable is an accountable item when issued to Marine Corps command (MARCOM) 
unit. Due to the extensive nature of that requirement, the USMC states “there is a need 
for a centralized inventory control system, to include centralized computation of 
requirements, procurement, initial issue provisioning distribution, and accountability of 
all assets owned by the USMC” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 1-15). Non-expendable items are 
non-consumable inventory that is recoverable to the USMC. For a better understanding of 
ICCE consumable goods, any form of individual clothing that would touch the skin of a 
Marine (e.g., undergarments), that is deemed expendable, and therefore a consumable 
good (DON USMC, 2014).   
As displayed in Figure 11, there are 52 strategically placed CSP facilities across 
21 worldwide geographic locations. Between 2011 and 2014, CSP locations repaired and 
replaced ICCE inventory valued at more than $114 million dollars for redistribution 
(USMC, 2015). In fiscal year (FY) 2014, the CSP processed 14.9 million pieces of 
equipment for 518,901 worldwide customers (USMC, 2015). Marine Corps Logistics 
Command (MARCORLOGCOM) states that “the CSP adds value [to the logistical 
supply process] by rapidly providing necessary equipment to the operating force in 
support of worldwide mission requirements” (USMC, 2015, p. 40). 
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Figure 11.  Consolidated Storage Point Locations. Source: DON USMC (2011). 
MARCORLOGCOM regulations do not require ICCE inventory to be serially 
managed. Therefore, CSPs “are required to maintain gain/loss transactions [ensuring 
100% property accountability] at all times. [Any and all unserviceable items discovered] 
shall be disposed of directly through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in accordance 
with Department of Defense [(DOD) 4140.1-R], Supply Chain Materiel Management 
Procedures:” Operational Requirements; DOD 4160.28, Vol. 3—Defense 
Demilitarization (DEMIL): Procedural Guidance Defense DEMIL: Procedural Guidance 
(DON USMC, 2014, 2-27). For example, DOD 4160.28 states that “uniform clothing 
stores and military exchange service stores shall not be allowed to sell DEMIL required” 
CCE and PPE (DOD, 2011, p. 57).  
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Figure 12 illustrates the two key elements to the USMC supply system: wholesale 
inventory level (general materiel support) and the retail inventory level (direct unit 
support).   
 
Figure 12.  Inventory Levels of Supply. Source: DON USMC (2014). 
The wholesale inventory level consists of a Marine Corps Inventory Control Point 
tasked with providing materiel management and inventory control for ground weapons 
systems and equipment. The Inventory Control Point is a central supply point for the 
USMC supply system and has explicit knowledge and control of worldwide Marine 
Corps inventory. Under the Inventory Control Point is the Remote Storage Activity 
(which is beyond the scope of this thesis) and the Direct Support Stock Control (United 
States Marine Corps Financial Management School, 2010). 
Retail inventory is considered the lowest level of the USMC’s supply system and 
is further segregated into two separate categories: intermediate inventory and consumer 
inventory. Consumer inventory is considered a unit level supply activity, primarily 
responsible for the distribution of equipment internal to Marine Corps units, specifically 
ICE and FR uniforms. As stated in MCO 4400.150, “consumer-level inventory can exist 
at any level whether strategic, operational, or tactical” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 1-2). 
When ICE and FR uniforms are requisitioned by a unit from their installation CSPs or 
unit issue facility (UIFs) for an upcoming deployment, consumer level supply operations 
ensure that the correct quantities of ICE and FR uniforms requisitioned are at the right 
place at the right time (DON USMC, 2014). Should an installation UIF not have the 
requisite quantity of equipment necessary to field units designated for deployment, those 
UIFs will reach back to the logistics services management centers for additional 
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quantities of ICE and FR uniforms.  UIFs only house enough ICE and FR uniforms to 
support designated deploying units on their respective installations (DON USMC, 2014).   
ICE (FR uniforms) require central inventory control at the CSP level due to the 
nonexpendable nature, monetary value, requirement for training, and sensitivity of this 
materiel.   
Intermediate inventory is managed at the direct support stockage control level and 
acts as the go between for consumer and wholesale inventory in support of an area of 
operation or a specified organization (DON USMC, 2014). The purpose of intermediate 
inventory is to place cash sale ICCE materiel, cleaning supplies, petroleum type items, 
and repair parts for basic maintenance strategically located around the world as a method 
of reducing logistical response times for any unit requests for ICE materiel.  The materiel 
located within the direct support stockage supply lines is not the same materiel type 
located within the CSP/IIF’s.  For an effective unit requisition of direct support stockage 
materiel to take place, the process requires four actions as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  The Requisition Process. Source: DON USMC (2014). 
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The requisitioning process is initiated with a submitted unit request to the supply 
resource manager due to potential unit capability gaps. The next step in the process is for 
the resource manager to validate user requirements and capability gaps, then notify the 
supply officer. The supply officer then reviews the request and determines if there is a 
valid need for the item requested. Should the command and supply officer approve the 
request, the request is then pushed through the supply resource manager to generate a 
commitment for request, order, and funding transaction code of the item in need. Upon 
request validation of the item, the request is forwarded for fulfillment. Once the requested 
item is received, the resource manager directs it for issue. It is important to note that 
requisitions are a vital necessity for all MARCOM units and are maintained until 
disbursement at the consumer supply level (DON USMC, 2014).  
b. Army Organizational and Individual Equipment (OCIE) Operations 
Prior to September 11, 2001, incoming Soldiers newly arrived on installation 
were required to in-process at installation central issuing facilities and receive specified 
OCIE in accordance with CTA 50-900. CTA 50-900 specified that central issuing 
facilities were required to prioritize issuance of older model OCIE first (DOA, 2008a). 
That requirement often resulted in Soldiers being issued antiquated equipment of varying 
pattern. For example, Soldiers scheduled to deploy to Iraq prior to the invasion, were 
issued desert camouflage patterned uniforms as shown in Figure 14, and woodland 
camouflage patterned flack vests and Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 
Technology, as shown in Figure 15. Quite often, due to limited supply, the desert 
camouflage uniforms issued to Soldiers were previously worn and already in a direct 
exchange serviceable state. When equipment is in a direct exchange state of 




Photo taken of author CPT Kirouac’s uniform 
Figure 14.  Desert Camouflage Pattern 
 
Photo taken of author CPT Kirouac’s uniform 
Figure 15.  Woodland Camouflage Pattern 
Donald Rumsfeld’s statement, “You go to war with the Army you have” (Kristol, 
2004, Introduction) did not sit well with Democrats in Congress. During a congressional 
meeting, Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd stated, “This [equipment condition] has 
been an ongoing question since the very outbreak of the conflict in Iraq. It’s as old as the 
conflict, going back when we learned that the Humvees that were going over there were 
not adequately armored” (Public Broadcasting Station, 2004).  
As a result of the Rumsfeld incident, all forms of logistical procurement and 
management required modernization enhancements (readiness) to the overall OCIE 
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process. The OCIE modernization process (circa 2004–2006) required the Army to 
prepare three documents, the Supply Request Package, the modernization plan, and the 
Master Fielding Plan (MFP). The first document, the Supply Request Package, sent 
technical data to the Defense Logistics Agency wholesale. The second document, the 
modernization plan, delineated the implementation of new OCIE and the phasing out of 
older antiquated OCIE. The third document, the MFP, supported the central fielding and 
funding of designated units for deployment on the upcoming patch chart. For 
understanding, a patch chart is nothing more than a list of units slated for an upcoming 
deployment. The Army used the Supply Request Package, Master Fielding Plan, and 
modernization plan as templates for coordinating budget, fielding, and modernization of 
designated items needed for priority elements during a prescribed timeframe 
(traditionally three years). After production of the designated OCIE items was complete, 
priority units received the required equipment, in addition to CIF facilities, and war 
reserve stocks, as needed.  
OCIE equipment designated for replacement was required to be issued to 
exhaustion. However, it was issued to units not designated for upcoming deployment. By 
exhausting current supplies, this allowed residual stocks to diminish, eliminating any 
future need of disposal.  
In 2006, Army vice chief of staff, General Richard A. Cody, commissioned the 
formation of an Integrated Process Team with the intent of determining the most optimal 
way of managing OCIE for the foreseeable future. As a result, General Cody 
commissioned the central management office with the mission of  “providing total asset 
visibility of OCIE with the intent of improving inventory management while enhancing 
Army Total Life Cycle Systems Management” (Organizational Clothing and Individual 
Equipment Central Management Office [OCIE CMO], 2016b, para. 2). The Central 
Management Office’s vision was to “manage the Soldier as a system and to optimize 
OCIE sustainment policies and processes under the Army Force Generation model as part 
of the PEO Soldier’s OCIE life cycle management strategy” (OCIE CMO, 2016a, vision).  
The OCIE Central Management Office (OCIE CMO) works as a subordinate to 
the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command and collaborates with the 
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Army G4 Integrated Logistics Support Center and PEO Soldier, as shown in Figures 16 
and 17 (OCIE CMO, 2016a, para. 2). 
 
Figure 16.  OCIE Management Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a). 
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Figure 17.  OCIE Funding Distribution Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a). 
The Army central point of contact would now become the OCIE CMO, which 
worked closely with PEO Soldier and DLA. The OCIE CMO was tasked with 
synchronizing sustainment activities for all OCIE items and providing disposition 
instructions for lateral transfer of any and all excess OCIE with the goal of maintaining 
total asset visibility (TAV; OCIE CMO, 2016a, para. 3). 
The scope of the CMO is limited to asset management and sustainment of OCIE 
assets across the Army. The OCIE life cycle management approach is managed in 
accordance with AR 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy. Headquarters, Department of the 
Army (HQDA) G8 tasked PEO Soldier with the responsibility of equipping the Army and 
recommending the scope of initial fielding necessary. Initial fielding quantities are 
“determined based on [G-8] guidance, urgency, operational needs, industrial capacity and 
available funding” (Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), 2007, p. 21).  
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Once quantities and timelines are established, the program manager (PM) identifies and 
coordinates with the appropriate agencies to achieve the most effective means for 
procuring, fielding, sustaining and training of the item. CMO provides asset visibility, 
usage data, readiness data and other information to facilitate PM planning.  
The Life Cycle Management Command is the Army’s central point for data 
gathering and analyses. Its mission is to ensure that the phase-in plan for newly 
introduced OCIE include up-front funding, a residual inventory reduction plans, 
sustainment strategy, and life-cycle cost estimates for the new OCIE items (OCIE CMO, 
2016a, para. 4). 
As OCIE pertains to army military clothing stores (AMCS), Soldiers use the 
AMCS to replace lost OCIE as a method of avoiding the statement of charges process. 
Nevertheless, the Army chooses not to stock high quantity levels of OCIE items in the 
AMCS due to excessive management and inventory costs. 
Per DLA guidance, the AMCS does not stock high dollar items in stores (e.g., 
sleeping bags, rucksacks, body armor, etc.). Funding to maintain higher valued items in 
the AMCS would require additional funding to the Army stock fund and an Unfunded 
Requirement (UFR) for base dollars to support that initiative. This increased funding 
requirement prompted the introduction of the Rapid Fielding Initiative. 
B. RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE 
In 2002, first deployers to Operation Iraqi Freedom reported individual equipment 
shortages where “[the] current budget did not allow Soldiers and units to have needed 
equipment available when they deployed, and the timeline for receiving the equipment 
was too long” (Whaley & Stewart, 2014, p. 538). In response to identified deficiencies 
and Soldier feedback, the vice chief of staff of the Army directed PEO Soldier to create a 
process to quickly distribute “mission-essential clothing and equipment” (DODIG, 2007, 
p. 1). The rapid fielding initiative was direct compliance to vice chief’s order. RFI is a 
process that the Army uses to distribute and equip OCIE materiel at the Soldier level 
(Carier, 2007). RFI “expedites acquiring and fielding up-to-date off-the-shelf clothing, 
individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool kits, hand tools, administrative 
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supplies, and equipment CLII to support Soldiers” (DODIG, 2007, p. 1).  RFI also 
specifically includes FR uniforms, the new standard for deploying Soldiers. 
RFI originally provided 49 items to 119,000 Soldiers deploying in support of both 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004 (Goerger, Crino, 
McCarthy, & Griffin, 2007, p. 4). Later, RFI expanded to include limited initial issue 
items required for specific camouflage-patterned CCE and eventually became the 
standard process for issuing to deploying Soldiers (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 4). RFI has 
continuously operated, since its beginning in fiscal year 2004 (see Figure 18), using 
emergency supplemental funding (DODIG, 2007). Once Overseas Contingency 
Operation (OCO) funding discontinues, RFI becomes an unfunded process. Presently, 
RFI equips approximately 60,000 Soldiers per year (Hoffman, 2016). 
 
Figure 18.  Number of Soldiers Issued RFI by Fiscal Year. Source: 
Hoffman (2016). 
RFI uses both existing programs of record for clothing, individual equipment, and 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases to outfit Soldiers with the equipment they 
need for the warfight (Whaley & Stewart, 2014, p. 538). PM SPIE briefed to industry that 
the list of RFI materiel is “updated, validated and resourced annually” (Hoffman, 2016, 
slide 37). Annual additions, deletions, and other changes keep the RFI list current. 
Table 3 provides a list of FY14 approved RFI on-hand storage materiel requirements in 
order to successfully field one Soldier the proper sizes on clothing and equipment. 
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Table 3.   RFI for One Soldier in FY14. Source: Mortlock & Super (2014). 










A2CU COAT (OCP) 15 GHILLIE HAT 1 
A2CU TROUSERS (OCP) 15 GHILLIE SUIT ACCESSORY KIT, FR, OCP 1 
A2CU, FG Cotton Undershirt -o 8 GLOVES-WINTER 5 
ACU FR (OCP) , Coat 37 Helmet Cover (OCP) 3 
ACU FR (OCP) , Trousers 36 Holster, Pistol (OCP) 1 
Army Combat Shirt (ACS) (OCP) 7 ICVC (OCP) 15 
Army Fuel Handlers Coveralls (TAN) 6 IMPROVED FIRST AID KIT (OCP) 1 
Army Patrol Cap (OCP) 14 Improved Helmet Retention System 2 
Army Sun Hat (OCP) 14 Infrared, IR Strobe – Small 1 
Bandage, Gauze Combat 1 IOTV, GEN II, Complete (OCP) 11 
Battery, Non-Chargeable 1 IR Flags 1 
Bladder, Hydration System (100oz New) 1 Knee & Elbow Protection System (OCP) 1 
BOOTS, Aviation/CVC Hot Weather Boots (FR) 112 Light Weight Performance Hood 1 
BOOTS, HWMCB Bates EO3612 - (HOT Weather) 106 MOLLE, Rucksack, Medium (OCP) 1 
BOOTS, MC Belleville 950 - (Temperature 
Weather) 106 MOLLE, Grenadier Set (OCP) 1 
BRACKET, LEVER (NOD) 1 MOLLE, Medic Set (OCP) 1 
Brassiere 5 MOLLE, Pistolman Set (OCP) 1 
COAT, GHILLIE SUIT BASE LAYER, FR, OCP 10 MOLLE, Saw Gunner Set (OCP) 1 
Disinfecting Kit 1 NAPE Pad (OCP) 2 
Ear Plugs, Combat 3 
PANTS, ARMY COMBAT, Guard, Piolet 
(Removable) 1 
ECWCS BOTTOM KIT (OCP) 15 
PANTS, ARMY COMBAT, Without 
KneePAD+Piolet 18 
ECWCS TOP KIT (OCP) 15 PROTECTIVE OUTER GARMENT (POG) 6 
EYEWEAR KIT, One size fits all 1 PROTECTIVE UNDER GARMENT (PUG) 6 
FR ACU Patch Kit (OCP) - Soldier Issue 1 Rank, Patch (OCP) 22 
FREE BOTTOM KIT (OCP) 18 Rank, Pin-On 22 
FREE SOCKS (4 PK) 5 Rifleman Set (w/TAP) (OCP) 1 
FREE TOP KIT (OCP) 18 Strap, Eyewear, Retention 1 
FREE, Gloves (OCP) 2 Strap, Involuntary, Restraint 1 
FREE, Rigger Belt (OCP) 6 TCAPS 2 




Once purchased, the clothing and equipment items are staged at various 
warehouses and staging facilities with a central storage facility located in Lansing, MI 
(Mortlock & Super, 2014). The Army Campaign Plan determines deployment numbers 
and is used to create a master fielding schedule (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 5). RFI uses the 
master fielding schedule to order finished goods, based on anticipated needs, which are 
then sent to various warehouses (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 5). Inventory is received, 
packaged and shipped-off to requirement fielding sites as forecasted, where it is 
individually issued (Carier, 2007). Some CLII equipment, like boots, are sent to the 
fielding sites at greater than 100% requirements to account for sizing requirements of the 
individual Soldier (Carier, 2007). The RFI concept uses a predictive tariff factoring 
model to estimate sizing requirements and quantities of the fielding site Soldier recipients 
(Goerger et al., 2007, p. 29). 
Excess organizational clothing materiel is returned to the Lansing, MI, warehouse 
where they are “checked for quality and re-shelved to support future fielding exercises” 
(Goerger et al., 2007, p. 24). In the event of a shortage, additional materiel is sent from 
the warehouse to fill the requirement (Carier, 2007). According to the Rapid Fielding 
Initiative Business Case Analysis, if the warehouse is out of stock, the required class II 
equipment is ordered and “shipped directly to the unit at a later date,” which can 
sometimes be after the Soldiers have deployed (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 6). Additionally, 
as evidenced at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, in-theater RFI warehouses “provide initial 
issue and theater-specific items” (Barkley, 2011, para. 2). The Rapid Fielding Initiative 
Business Case Analysis from June 2007 states, RFI’s primary objective is “to field 100% 
of Soldiers deploying to theater with 100% of their RFI items 30 days prior to conducting 
their mission readiness exercise” (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 8). From beginning to end, RFI 
takes the following steps: 
1. Utilize RFI Equipment List – Approved by HQDA G-3/5/7 
2. Review Master Fielding Schedule 
3. Conduct Strategic Planning 
4. Bring-in refurbished OCIE and procure new OCIE, and ship to warehouse 
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5. Warehouse packages and ships equipment to fielding sites 
6. Equipment is fielded  
7. Retrieve and Order additional equipment as needed, and send it to the Unit 
(Mortlock & Super, 2014, slide 3) 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. UNITED STATES ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCK (APS) 
The USA and USMC both preposition materiel around the globe to streamline and 
coordinate logistics requirements with effectiveness and efficiency in response to either a 
military conflict or to support any humanitarian assistance needs. The main goal is to 
“deliver the [right materiel] at the right place and at the right time” as well as reduce the 
logistical timeline for delivery of heavy equipment to the warfighter in theater (United 
States Joint Forces Command, 2006, p. 2). In contrast to OCIE doctrine which states that 
OCIE is carried as to accompany troops (TAT).  With more expeditionary deployments, 
the deterrence strategy relies more and more on power projection rapidity (DOA, 2015c). 
Positioning materiel at the right place improves time significantly and supports 
the mission as long as the materiel is what is needed. Based on the concept of forward 
projection of power, prepositioning materiel is the fastest way to respond to an emergent 
conflict. The APS concept is deployed in five different locations, as shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19.  Army Pre-positioned Stock. Source: Association of the USA (2008). 
Per ATP 3-35.1, APS encompasses pre-positioned “unit sets of equipment, 
operational project stocks, Army War Reserve Sustainment [stocks], and War Reserve 
Stocks for Allies” (DOA, 2015a, p. 2).  Army Sustainment Command (ASC) manages 
this equipment however, the materiel is under the responsibility of the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) (DOA, 2015a). 
The current operational temp overseas and the sequester create issues for APS. 
ASC has met difficulties rebuilding stocks afloat and modernizing equipment to meet the 
current demands of the warfighters facing constant changes during conflicts. APS 
personnel face constant pressure from degrading readiness. The association of the USA 
stated, “It is not just the age and condition of APS equipment and cumbersome systems at 
issue. The salient issue is whether APS possesses the right equipment in sufficient 
number, properly sited and well-maintained” (Association of the USA, 2008, p. 5). 
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The Automated Battle Book System (ABS) displays what is available at each APS 
location. Under APS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), it is important to note the 
concepts of materiel not authorized for pre-positioning (NAP) and to-accompany-troops 
(TAT) items. NAP and TAT are materiel required to be brought to theater from the home 
station (e.g., expensive radio communication items). Troops deploying into theater must 
carry their personal OCIE due to its “cost, availability, sensitivity or unsuitability for 
storage” and is comparable to the NAP concept (DOA, 2015a, p. 1-4). Examples of TAT 
and NAP items are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Examples of TAT and NAP Items. Source: DOA 
(2015c, Table 1-1). 
 
 
APS is managed by both Army, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), and 
the support of DLA (see Figure 20).  
38 
 
Figure 20.  APS Program Organization. Source: DOA (2015c, Figure 2-1). 
APS operation functions are comprised of five stages: Planning, Deployment, 
Employment, Redeployment and Regeneration. When contingencies emerged overseas, 
the key enabling steps for APS are as follows: 
1. Strategic lift: Troops and personal materiel is transported to the aerial port 
of debarkation (APOD). 
2. APOD Troops and personal materiel are consolidated as close as possible 
near the theater of operations. 
3. Seaport of debarkation (SPOD): Pre-positioning ships are deliver class VII 
materiel near the theater of operations. 
4. Staging Base: Troops are setting up bases in theater 
5. Surface Transportation Infrastructure and Movement Control: Routes and 
schedules are put in place to allow materiel and additional troops to be 
transported to forward staging bases. 
6. Security: Base are safe and secure within theater 
7. Logistics Support: Constant and reliable logistics is provided through 
warfighters and enablers. 
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The USMC can also tap into APS to support any contingencies assigned overseas. 
In addition, they are deployed in Norway with the Norway Air-Landed Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) and at sea with the maritime prepositioning force 
(MPF). These two programs support the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and 
additional forward deployed units. The purpose of these three programs (APS, 
NALMEB, and MPF) are to support a rapid deployment of forces and to support the 
United States National Defense Strategy.  
As mentioned in the Prepositioning Program Handbook, “Operations Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm (Southwest Asia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Iraqi Freedom have 
all benefited from the support of both programs above. Time and strategic lift were 
conveniently located and immediately available to Combatant Commanders” (USMC, 
2009, p. i). Of note, all materiel pre-positioned under APS cognizance does not contain 
CCE or PPE (see Table 5 and 6). 
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Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC), AMC, and MSC under 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) support the movement and 
staging of forward materiel. APS, AMC, and MSC are often called the strategic mobility 
triad. 
B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE CONCEPT 
1. Purpose 
The DEB concept includes two primary categories of Soldier OCIE: fire retardant 
uniforms and upgraded personal protective equipment (PPE) like Soldier Protection 
System (SPS), which includes a helmet, ballistics vest, hard armor plates, protective 
eyewear, and integral sensor system. (PM SPIE, 2013). 
2. Summary 
Per the Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016, Annex B—Terms of 
Reference, the DEB is an equipping concept in draft form designed to ensure that the 
latest operational flame retardant (FR) uniforms, clothing and individual equipment are 
immediately available to field to deploying Soldiers, meeting the capability that PEO 
Soldier’s RFI using Overseas Contingency Operation funds currently provides 
(DOA, 2013a). 
This concept would support a current lack of planning in OCIE and Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements at low cost in case of a sudden major conflict 
and deployment of troops up to 15 brigades (PM SPIE, 2013). In the DEB cost benefit 
analysis dated December 5, 2013, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center studied and 
reviewed the DEB concept in full detail. It operates similarly to RFI, but is funded from 
the base budget in a non-contingent environment.  The goal is to ensure that the latest 
OCIE is ready to immediately field to deploying Soldiers. It provides decreased 
operational risks and lessens the chance that the Army (or any other branches of the U.S. 
Armed Forces) will have to pay a high-price for an unplanned and massive rush orders to 
equip an entire force with the most advanced equipment available and still maintain an 
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inventory in case of further emergent needs when faced with a sudden major conflict (PM 
SPIE, 2013). 
Currently, the Armed Forces Exchange website lists the Army OCP blouse and 
trouser (non-FR) total cost per set at $95.51 (Armed Forces Exchange, n.d.). According 
to PM SPIE in Table 10, the FR ACU blouse and trouser total cost per set is $175; an 
increase of 83% over standard OCP uniforms.  Due to high price differentials, the Army 
does not issue FR ACUs prior to a deployment and only issues to deploying warfighters. 
The DEB concept supports deploying forces in camouflage uniforms, along with OCIE 
and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE; PM SPIE, 2013). 
A goal of the DEB concept is to provide time for the industrial base to ramp up 
and launch the production of additional items for follow-on deployers and future 
sustainment (PM SPIE, 2013). Edgewood Chemical Biological Center’s cost benefit 
analysis, dated December 5, 2013, shows concern for major conflicts from the RFI OCO 
funded environment. It could take up to 12 to 15 months to equip and field 15 brigades 
and their support team.  
The DEB concept recommends that the Army maintain and manage the DEB 
inventory and provide a loop system to make sure the equipment stored is the best the 
Warfighter can get (PM SPIE, 2013). Like the RFI system, the DEB stock is modernized 
as new equipment comes on line and older equipment is issued to the troops in 
continental United States (CONUS) in accordance with HDQA G-3/5/7 priorities (PM 
SPIE, 2013). Upon termination of contingency operations, surplus RFI is responsible for 
replenishment of updated DEB inventory (PM SPIE, 2013). DEB could also support the 
Global Reaction Force with FR uniforms and modern PPE (PM SPIE, 2013). 
The DEB concept received the endorsement of Maneuver Center of Excellence 
(MCoE; Sando, 2012) and Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). A detailed 
storage and sustainment plan is the natural following step for this idea. A solid cost 




PEO Soldier manages the rapid fielding initiative, a similar concept to DEB.  
However, RFI exists in a well-funded Oversea Contingency Operations environment and 
hot industrial base (PM SPIE, 2013). 
With a potential cessation of hostilities and RFI funding coming to an end, it is 
prudent to develop a process to equip first deploying brigades for future deployments 
post OCO funding (PM SPIE, 2013). One of the key points of the DEB concept is about 
FR uniforms (PM SPIE, 2013). For instance, infantry personnel in CONUS are not 
equipped with FR garments and in the case of a sudden deployment requirement, FR 
uniforms are not issued until well after departure from home duty station. The DEB 
process would mind the FR gap and provide specific FR uniforms and PPE (PM 
SPIE, 2013). 
HQDA guidance is in full alignment with this concept (PM SPIE, 2013). The 
DEB concept follows the FY13 Defense Planning Guidance for regional deployment and 
aligns with the FY12 Soldier Modernization Strategy and the FY15 Army Equipment 
Modernization Strategy.  
The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014 is in the same alignment as it states, 
“The ready capabilities of American military forces allow the United States to respond 
quickly around the world, providing a presence that advances U.S. national security and 
contributes to global peace and stability” (DOA, 2014a, p. 1). 
The document continues, “If these fiscal constraints remain, resulting in an 
undersized and less ready Army, it leaves the Congress, future administrations, and the 
Nation with severely reduced options for military action to prevent, deter or win conflict” 
(PM SPIE, 2013b, p. 1 ). 
To rapidly field the most up-to-date equipment for a future conflict within a non-
contingent environment, including deep budget cuts and possibilities of a dormant and 




 large and dormant stock of OCIE materiel in support of deployers and enablers (PM 
SPIE, 2013). The DEB concept intends to answer the future unexpected demand to 
support this capability (PM SPIE, 2013). 
4. How Deployer Equipment Bundle Concept Works 
Under the DEB concept, the Army would assign an office of primary 
responsibility (OPR) to procure, stock, upgrade, and issue DEB OCIE materiel as 
required (PM SPIE, 2013). 
a. Procurement and Stockage  
The OPR would work with responsible Army staff agencies to ensure base 
funding for the DEB concept is included in future Army program objective memorandum 
(POM) submissions. The DEB concept is funded with Equipping Program Evaluation 
Group (EE PEG) Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) funding. DEB will use the 
RFI storage concept (PM SPIE, 2013). Systems like container inserts, tactical lockers, 
rack systems, contingency rack systems, or content specific solutions will significantly 
reduce the concerns about the flexibility and speed required to respond to a contingency 
and outfit 15 brigades (PM SPIE, 2013). In 2013, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 
developed a cost benefit analysis to address advantages and inconveniences to central 
storage versus regional storage (Richards et al., 2013). 
b. Upgrading  
The DEB concept will supply the most up-to-date OCIE materiel available. 
Annually, the OPR will receive an army approved; revised list of Organizational Clothing 
Individual Equipment (OCIE) items in accordance with G-3/5/7 priorities and submits 
follow-on requirements to DLA Troop Support office in support of continuous upgrades 
for materiel in storage (PM SPIE, 2013).  
c. Issuance and Outfitting 
In support of immediate contingency operations, first deployers and enablers are 
outfitted with the most technically advanced equipment inventoried in the DEB 
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warehouse under the supervision of the assigned DEB OPR (PM SPIE, 2013). Congress 
will then activate OCO funding, which will allow replenishment of DEB materiel for 
future conflicts (PM SPIE, 2013). RFI is then re-activated or ramped-up if necessary and 
take the relay of the DEB concept in an OCO funding environment (PM SPIE, 2013). 
5. Deployer Equipment Bundle Set Composition 
The DEB concept provides FR uniforms and PPE accessories on the annually 
reviewed list, similar to the current RFI list. Outfitting up to 15 brigades or 4,700 
warfighters and enablers is the goal and can used as a planning factor (PM SPIE, 2013). 
Therefore, an effective clothing size tariff ensures all Soldiers are issued properly sized 
items to their body composition (PM SPIE, 2013). 
As shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9, the draft DEB concept plan dated February 20, 
2013, delineates a prescribed list of required items. 
Table 7.   BCT Set with Transitional plus Arid/Desert Uniforms and 




Table 8.   BCT Set with Transitional plus Woodland/Jungle Uniforms. 
Source: PM SPIE (2013). 
 





In accordance with the DEB concept plan, theater CIFs would manage and sustain 
first deployers through a direct exchange operation until CONUS manufactures ramped 
up to required production levels (PM SPIE, 2013). Planning Figures to support this 
program are based upon historical data of annual replacement percentages of 20% for 
uniform items, 10% for PPE (PM SPIE, 2013). 
Initial estimates for the cost to support DEB activity is at $7.3 million annually 
(PM SPIE, 2013; see Table 10). Additionally, the plan states OCO funding is re-activated 
upon declared contingency in support of the RFI initiative to replenish DEB warehouse 
stocks in support of follow-on crisis. 
Table 10.   DEB Sustainment Costs (Supplemental Funding after DEB 
Fielding). Source: PM SPIE (2013). 
 
7. Application to the Global Response Force (GRF) 
The primary mission of the Fort Bragg Global Response Force (GRF) is to deploy 
17 hours no notice and extract American civilians from war zones. Additionally, GRF 
provides support to allies facing natural disasters (PM SPIE, 2013). For instance, a GRF 
brigade deployed to Haiti in 2010 following the earthquake disaster (PM SPIE, 2013). 
With the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threat, GRF is required to be ready at a 
ready state at a moment’s notice (PM SPIE, 2013). Therefore, the DEB concept is 
directly applicable to GRF operations (PM SPIE, 2013). The DEB concept plan states 
that a GRF would benefit from the DEB, having immediate access to up-to-date 
equipment. The Army would support deploying Soldiers through either RFI or DEB, 
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whether OCO funding was available or not (PM SPIE, 2013). Additionally, sustainment 
must be accounted for to better forecast program lifecycle costs (PM SPIE, 2013).   
In addition, every 18 months the next GRF unit must be equipped with the most 
advanced materiel available within the DEB inventory (PM SPIE, 2013). Continuous 
replenishment of the DEB storage location will have to be considered with additional 
support funding (PM SPIE, 2013). 
Initial PM SPIE estimates for the costs to support GRF are around $50 million per 
an 18-month period (see Table 11). A GRF element is 3,865 warfighters, which is 
slightly smaller than standard brigade-size element of 4,700 warfighters (PM 
SPIE, 2013). 
Table 11.   GRF Projected Annual Costs Based upon an 18-Month Fielding 
Cycle. Source: PM SPIE (2013). 
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**Note: Table 11 identifies that GRF projects annual costs based on an 18 month fielding 
cycle.  This includes, an expanded DEB list beyond just FR ACUs and PPE.  
8. Path Forward 
Upon DEB concept approval, ASA (ALT) will assign an office of primary 
responsibility (OPR) to design a precise DEB storage solution and fielding process (PM 
SPIE, 2013). Then, the HQDA G-3/5/7, DOA Military Operations-Capability Integration 
Division (DAMO-CI) will provide a solution to equip units like GRF when operating in 
non-combat exercises (PM SPIE, 2013). 
9. Summary 
The DEB is a Soldier readiness deployment concept that is capable of supporting 
early deploying brigade combat teams (BCT) outside an OCO funding environment and 
mending the gap between the current existing RFI program and an environment absent of 
contingency. According to PM SPIE: 
The DEB concept will outfit 15 BCTs and enablers of first deployers to 
the next major contingency with the most modern, lifesaving equipment 
available, providing sufficient buffer stock to enable the industrial base to 
ramp up to full capacity. This concept procures OCIE/PPE for immediate 
capability needs and will include FR uniforms, along with OCIE. The 
DEB concept increases flexibility while reducing operational risks and 
costs to the Army. This concept allows for continuous technology 
refreshment of stocks in storage and, once activated for fielding, 
seamlessly integrates with and facilitates transition to the RFI List as 









IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DOTMLPF – DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE 
Chapter IV conveys the research and data analysis process. In the first section of 
chapter IV, we use the DOTmLPF matrix (see Table 12) to qualitatively compare the 
Deployer Equipment Bundle concept to the Rapid Fielding Initiative, the Army 
Preposition Stock activity, the United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing & Combat 
Equipment sustainment activity, and the United States Army Organizational Clothing & 
Individual Equipment sustainment activity. The intent of the comparative analysis is to 
derive the similarities and differences between the chosen processes to further identify 
DEB’s internalities and externalities. Additionally, we evaluated the comparative analysis 
above and injected those conclusions into a strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats 
DEB assessment. Next, we conducted a quantitative analysis of two separate conditions, 
the Army with the DEB concept and a legacy low-level RFI status quo. To do this, we 
define criteria variable capability gaps (DOTmLPF, 2005). When referencing the DEB, 




Table 12.   DOTmLPF Matrix Summary 
 
RFI 





(United States Marine Corps – 
Individual Clothing and 
Combat Equipment) 
OCIE 
(Organizational Clothing Individual 
Equipment) 
DEB 
(Deployer Equipment Bundle) 
D 
Doctrine 
Responsibility to provide 
organizational clothing 
and critical combat 
equipment to deploying 
Soldiers. No doctrine 
available. 
Step-by-Step regulative 
structure for training, 
exercise, contingencies and 
retrograde operations. 
New concept, like DEB. 
Issuance of materiel to troops 
in support of contingency 
operations. Troops train with 
same materiel issued during 
contingency. 
Well regulated. Note that specific 
materiel stored in specific CIF 
facilities (i.e., cold weather 
equipment) 
DEB stores a specified number 
of BCTs worth of FR ACUs 
and SPS components (helmet, 
vest, plates, eyewear & 
sensors). RFI stores materiel to 
support deployment schedules.  
O 
Organization 
PEO Soldier managed 
vertical integration. 
Well-structured organization 
located in CONUS and 
OCONUS under AMC, 
TRANSCOM, SDDC, MSC 
Like DEB concept, ICCE uses 
narrow organization hierarchy 
(3 levels) 
Life cycle management 
organization, which operates in 
steady state capacity. Uses narrow 
organization hierarchy (3 levels). 
No organization currently 
managing DEB. Shallow chain 
of command (Acquisition 
organization – 4 levels). 
Contingency operations only. 
T 
Training 
Training for new items 
occurs at the facilitating 
event. 
All training requirements 
well described under 
doctrine. Regular training 
exercises are conducted. 
Training requirements are still 
being refined. No additional 
training required. 
No training provided to deployers on 
how to use the materiel issued. 
Long-term training provided to 
warehouse personnel. 
Long-term storage training 
required. Troops will not train 




Small quantity of materiel 
stored, but same items as 
DEB. 
APS and DEB have the 
same purpose in supporting 
readiness with large materiel 
quantities issued during 
contingency. 
Like DEB, FR-ACU only 
issued during contingencies. 
All the remaining and 
required OCIE is issued 
during training. Materiel 
issued covers multiple pattern. 
Materiel not serially tracked and 
uses algorithm to determine 
inventory levels. FR-ACU uniforms 
are not issued. CIF facilities manage 
the materiel, not OCIE LCMC. 
OCIE owns the facility. 
Annual scheduling dictates 
DEB materiel issuance during a 
contingency. Troops don’t train 
with gear issued. 
L 
Leadership 
PEO Soldier tasked in 
2002 with mission set. 
High level of internal and 
external communication 
required. The life cycle 
community supports the 
program.  
Recognize developing stage of 
the Consolidated Storage 
Program. Like DEB, the life 
cycle management community 
supports the new concept.   
Robust program with many lessons 
learned. DEB is a new program. 
Director of Capabilities 
Development and integration 
on behalf of the deputy chief of 
staff and G-3/5/7 task ASA 
(ALT to assign an OPR).   
P 
Personnel 
Same personnel as RFI 
managing DEB in a non-
contingency environment. 
Mix of civilian and 
military personnel. 
Additional qualified 
personnel required during 
surge. Mix of civilian and 
military personnel. 
Like DEB uses a mix of 
civilian and military 
personnel. 
Like DEB, uses a mix of civilian and 
military personnel. 
Additional personnel required 
during surge capacity 
requirements. Mix of civilian 
and military personnel. 
F 
Facilities 
Operates out of Lansing, 
MI warehouse and 
multiple fielding sites. 
Requires additional fielding 
facilities when contingency 
starts. Globally positioned. 
Uses multiple facilities. Decentralized organization. No additional warehouse required. Centrally located. 
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1. Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) 
This section compares and contrasts the Rapid Fielding Initiative to the Deployer 
Equipment Bundle concept. 
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that RFI is 
tasked to procure, store and ultimately field organizational clothing and critical combat 
equipment to deploying Soldiers. DEB doctrine takes over the RFI process to procure and 
store inventory to desired levels as a means of achieving readiness. Our analysis 
determines when comparing the two concepts, the significant doctrinal difference is in 
the storage concept. DEB stores a specific number of BCT’s quantity of materiel and the 
RFI stores variable quantities of equipment relative to the projected deployment schedule. 
A similarity between the two concepts is the quality of materiel and item types. For RFI 
and the DEB, both contain CCE deemed to be the exact same and are determined during 
annual review procedures.        
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that PEO 
Soldier is tasked to manage RFI operations. At this time, there is no specific organization 
managing the DEB as it is still in concept state.   
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that for RFI, 
training occurs internal to the organization. At this time there are no official internal 
training processes prescribed for the DEB. However, for both the RFI and DEB 
processes, during fielding events, should there exist a new piece of equipment unfamiliar 
to the warfighter, on the spot training would take place allowing users to understand the 
intricacies of that equipment. Additionally, there is an assumption that both processes 
would implement train the trainer classes with end users on unfamiliar equipment in 
question.   
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that when 
comparing the two concepts, there is no significant materiel differences between RFI and 
DEB operations. A noteworthy similarity between the two programs is the CCE 
equipment types chosen.   
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Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that in 2002 
the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked PEO Soldier with the RFI mission set 
(Carrier, 2007). Additionally, in 2012, the Director of Capabilities Development and 
Integration on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 tasked PEO Soldier with 
managing the DEB concept (Sando, 2012).   
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that personnel 
requirements are identical for both concepts for day-to-day operations. However, the 
DEB concept operates under surge capacity conditions. This condition necessitates the 
requirement for additional personnel to manage due to rapid fielding surge capacity 
requirements.   
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that at this time, 
there is no specific facility housing the DEB as it is still in concept state. However, as 
mentioned in the leadership paragraph, both processes are designated to operate out of the 
Lansing, Michigan facility or similar existing Army warehouses.   
2. Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) 
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that an 
exhaustive step-by-step regulative structure governs APS operations in comparison to the 
DEB, which has no doctrine in its present form. 
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that APS is 
comprehensively structured with an expansive depth and range to its organization. Army 
Materiel Command chain-of-command activities include Sustainment Command, 
Strategy Logistics Activity (when deployed), four support brigades and six Army support 
battalions. Horizontally, supporting activities include United States Transportation 
Command, Surface Deployment Distribution Command, and Military Sealift Command. 
In contrast, the DEB concept has a relatively shallow construct with three chain-of-
command levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE.  
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that a single 
over-arching regulation dictates all training requirements for APS operations. The 
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training is regularly reviewed using constant process improvement. No overarching 
formal training requirement exists for the DEB program, however, if adopted, official 
training is institutionalized and planned ahead of time. 
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both APS 
and DEB have the same purpose, to deliver pro-active readiness. Additionally, when a 
sudden contingency occurs, both programs house and deliver large fixed quantities of 
materiel to the Warfighter fielding sites. Furthermore, one major difference, the root of 
our thesis, organizational clothing (CL II) is not a component of Army pre-positioned 
stocks. 
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that a major 
requirement, for both APS and DEB, are to have an effective high level of internal and 
external communication. The major difference lies in the doctrinal relevance of either 
community which shapes leadership behavior. APS leadership works within the life cycle 
management community, whereby DEB leadership works within the acquisition 
community.  
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that in support 
of contingency operations, both the APS and DEB utilize qualified personnel. In the 
event of a contingency and fielding requirement of DEB assets, additional qualified 
personnel are required to perform mission support. 
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that APS and 
DEB both possess facilities with a square footage capacity necessary to perform their 
primary functions. Additionally, when contingency is declared, both the APS 
prepositioning ships and the DEB staging warehouse require additional fielding sites. 
However, a significant difference between APS and DEB is the number of facilities and 
locations. APS is globally positioned in nine locations. In contrast, DEB materiel is 
staged in the Lansing, MI warehouse current facilities, but it is still to be determined. 
Furthermore, APS land-based sights do not require additional facilities to conduct 
operations whereby the DEB staging warehouse does. Both facilities are subject to the 
“act of God,” however, APS facilities carry additional vulnerability to antagonist activity. 
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3. United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment 
(USMC ICCE) 
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the Marines 
issue what the Army considers initial issue clothing through the Individual Issue 
Facilities (IIF) and organizational clothing through Unit Issue Facilities (UIF). One 
similarity between ICCE and the DEB is the relative newness of each operational 
concept. In 2011, the USMC created the CSP program and nested the IIFs and UIFs 
underneath. The DEB program is still in a conceptual state, therefore doctrine is not yet 
concrete. Another similarity between ICCE and DEB is the issuance of supplemental gear 
for a contingent operation. For the Marines, an example is fire-retardant clothing. 
However, for the Army, DEB issue is FR ACUs and SPS component items. A significant 
difference between the USMC and DEB is that the USMC issues CCE to a Marine who 
trains on and deploys with that specific CCE. PM SPIE fields DEB equip only after a 
contingency is declared with the possibility that the Soldier may not be trained on the 
CCE received from the DEB fielding. Under the DEB concept, there is a potential 
requirement for units to update SOPs and reflect changes as Soldiers deploy with materiel 
configurations different from what they train on. However, this is only a minor issue. 
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the 
USMC and DEB both use a narrow hierarchy organization. ICCE uses 4-levels: Marine 
Corps Logistics Command Group, the Logistics Service Management Center, the 
Consolidated Storage Program, individual issue facilities and the Unit Issuing UIF. In 
contrast, the DEB concept uses 3-levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE. 
Summarily, at the lowest level for the USMC, CCE is sent to multiple individually 
managed IIF/UIF organizations. 
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that due to the 
newness of both programs, training requirements are still being refined. However, the 
difference between the ICCE program and DEB concept is the training required for long-
term inventory management. ICCE personnel receive life-cycle management training to 
include long-term storage and care requirements. DEB personnel are acquisitions 
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management trained, and due to their high stock turn rate of CCE equipment, may not 
have a long-term storage training. 
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that USMC 
ICCE and DEB materiel to be similar in type and pattern. Another similarity between 
ICCE and the DEB is that neither outfitting concept tracks CCE through individual serial 
numbers. There are two significant differences. First, in a contingent environment, a 
Marine only receives FR ACU, but the DEB Soldier receives everything all at once. 
Second, a Marine receives two-types of authorized uniforms.  
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines both 
leadership communities are dedicated to their programs. Due to the relative infancy of 
ICCE operations, USMC leadership is operating in a learning and improvement stage. 
According to the Marine Corps Logistics Command’s Logistics Solutions for the 
Warfighter, leadership is “currently developing the Consolidated Storage Program (CSP) 
requirement” (Marine Corps Logistics Command, 2017, para. 1) Similarly, DEB 
leadership experiences change management with the integration of increased and long-
term storage requirements.  
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both ICCE 
and DEB operations utilize a mix of uniformed service members and civilians. The 
USMC operates steady-state at all times with a fixed number of personnel. In contrast, 
the DEB requires additional personnel to conduct surge fielding requirements.  
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the USMC 
ICCE and DEB programs utilize centrally managed facilities. A significant difference 
between the two programs is that USMC ICCE utilizes multiple IIF and UIF locations to 
stage and field CCE. In contrast to ICCE, the DEB utilizes a singular staging warehouse 
and external facilities to conduct fielding operations.  
4. Organizational Clothing Individual Equipment 
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both the 
OCIE CMO life cycle management program and the DEB concept are similar in the fact 
that both contain CCE that is not serially tracked. Significant differences between the two 
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programs are, OCIE CMO life cycle management program utilizes regulations to 
determine what OCIE (cold weather equipment) types are housed within specific CIF’s. 
The DEB contains cold weather equipment under the auspice that it has the potential of 
being utilized in cold weather environments. An additional variance between the two 
programs is that the OCIE CMO life cycle management operates CIF’s that work in a 
steady state capacity issuing CCE to Soldiers, in comparison to the DEB, which operates 
and issues CCE to Soldiers only on a contingent surge capacity. Lastly, OCIE LCMC 
manages CCE utilizing a peak issue methodology algorithm to determine when and how 
much inventory to replenish (Fan & Loredo, 2013). In comparison to the DEB, which 
orders CCE annually, that order is in direct relation to the forecasted deployers for the 
upcoming fiscal year.    
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both 
programs run in completely different aspects. OCIE CMO operates its CIF’s within the 
life cycle management community, whereas the DEB operates within the acquisitions 
community. The hierarchy for OCIE management is the U.S. Army TACOM LCMC 
(Tank and Automotive Command Life Cycle Management Community), the Central 
Management Office, and the individual Central Issuing Facilities.   In contrast, the DEB 
concept command structure is 3 levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE.  
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that training for 
both OCIE management and the DEB are internal to their respective programs. However, 
a slight difference between the two programs is that OCIE training after issuance of new 
equipment to the warfighter is not provided. In contrast, DEB provides initial training on 
new equipment immediately upon issue to the warfighter. An additional difference 
between the two programs is that the OCIE CIF personnel receive life-cycle management 
training to include long-term storage and care requirements. DEB personnel are 
acquisitions management trained, and due to their high stock turn rate of CCE equipment, 
may not have a long-term storage training. 
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that a similarity 
between the two programs is that neither the OCIE LCMC process nor the DEB process 
track CCE via individual serialized numbering. Additionally, both programs refurbish 
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and recirculate serviceable CCE turned back into their respective programs as a measure 
of cost savings. There are two significant variances between the two programs. First, the 
OCIE LCMC does not issue FR ACU uniforms to Soldiers, whereas RFI does. Second, 
OCIE LCMC owns OCIE CCE. However, installation-owned CIF’s and its personnel 
house and manage this equipment. In contrast, DEB is owned and managed entirely 
through PEO Soldier. However, a minute similarity between the DEB and OCIE are that 
the DEB, like OCIE, are both issued within installation-owned facilities.   
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines there is little 
similarity between the two programs except Army leaders command both organizations. 
In 2006, the OCIE LCMC implemented its current program. Over the past eleven years, 
OCIE LCMC has had the opportunity to conduct process refinement through lessons 
learned. In contrast, the DEB concept, if enacted, is an entirely new program from which 
leaders have only their past experiences from other programs which to draw lessons 
learned.  
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both 
OCIE CMO and DEB operations utilize a mix of uniformed service members and 
civilians. The OCIE CMO operates steady-state at all times with a fixed number of 
dedicated civilian personnel and only one military member. In contrast, the DEB requires 
additional personnel to conduct surge fielding requirements.    
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the OCIE 
CMO and DEB utilize appropriate sizing facilities to conduct operations. A significant 
difference between the two programs is that the OCIE CMO utilizes decentralized 
facilities. For example, there are CIF’s on every major Army installation. In contrast to 
the OCIE CMO, the DEB utilizes a singular staging warehouse and external facility sites 
to conduct fielding operations.  
B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE SWOT ANALYSIS 
From the DOTmLPF analysis, we identified a number of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats assigned to DEB see Table 13. The intent of this section is to 
flush out criteria necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis. 
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Table 13.   SWOT Matrix for DEB Analysis 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
- Annual Validation 
- Non-Contingency Readiness 
- Reduced Learning Curves 
- Centrally Located Optimal CCE 
- Component Servicing Capability 
- Singular Management 




- Leverage Lessons Learned 
- Executive Priorities 
- Configuration Scalability  
- Hub and Spoke Logistics 
- Incremental Force Modernization 
- Managerial Oversight 
- Funding and Appropriation 
- Changing Executive Priorities 




Annual Validation: Through annual review, CCE currently in the DEB program 
is validated for warfighter needs. If the materiel is no longer required for DEB warehouse 
storage, the materiel is removed from the Lansing, MI warehouse and fielded to end-
users as required. If validated for inclusion in the DEB, materiel is compared against the 
commercial industry off the shelf items to ensure the best available equipment is 
procured and included in the DEB. Additionally, materiel in the RDT&E process is 
reviewed for maturity and potential inclusion in the DEB (Richards et al., 2013, p. 59). 
Non-contingency Readiness: The ultimate goal of DEB when a large-scale 
contingency is declared, is to create readiness in a non-contingent environment through 
acquisition and staging the best CCE available for a specific number of BCTs. 
Additionally, DEB ensures a warm industrial base, reducing ramp-up time for acquisition 
and fielding activities. DEB also uses fiscal resources to bridge the gap between base-line 
and war-time fielding requirements. As a planning factor, Richards et al. state for 
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example, “Contingency scenarios dictate up to 15 BCT’s having DEB capability and 
deploying within 60-days (11 in 30 days, and an additional (4) in 60 days) after notice to 
execute” (Richards et al., 2013, p. 59).  
Reduced Learning Curves: The seamless transition from status quo RFI to DEB 
operations would rapidly reduce the learning curve for existing employees. The 
similarities between the programs create an inherent strength due to the ease of 
implementation and executability. The primary change environment from RFI to DEB is 
the source of funding.   
Centrally Located Optimal CCE: All CCE requirements and fire retardant 
uniforms are centrally staged in one single location for efficiency. Installation CIF’s in 
close proximity to the Soldier only have non-FR ACUs, which may not be the necessary 
materiel for deployment, which disqualifies the advantage of a CIF’s proximity on base. 
Component Servicing Capability: CIF’s only provide service to their 
Installation’s Commands. The DEB services all Army components: active, guard, and 
reserves, regardless to location or component. Therefore, the deployer expeditiously 
receives everything they need and are fully-equipped for the mission. 
Singular Management: A logistical drawback to status quo OCIE operations is 
that installation owned CIF’s manage CMO LCMC owned equipment. One single 
organization owns and manages DEB OCIE. This single ownership streamlines 
administrative and operational requirements.  
2. Weaknesses 
Forward Staging: To be effective, the DEB requires significant resources to 
conduct staging and fielding operations. The DEB operates exclusively from a CONUS 
logistical footprint.  Soldiers must receive all CCE and PPE prior to deploying otherwise, 
Soldiers deploy to a potentially immature logistical battlespace with the CCE and PPE 
the currently possess.  
Training:  On occasion, Soldiers have not previously trained on CCE and PPE 
received during fielding events.  This new equipment poses an operational risk to 
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Soldiers due to the injection of unfamiliar items that are not customized or configured to 
the units SOPs.  Albeit a weakness, it has minimal impact.  Unit SOPs are living 
breathing documents.  Once the equipment is received, units have the ability to adjust 
existing SOPs and briefly familiarize their Soldiers with the DEB equipment prior to 
entering a battlespace.   
3. Opportunities 
Leverage Lessons Learned:  When tasked and funded, the Acquisition 
Community will seamlessly incorporate DEB concept procedures into baseline RFI 
functions performed. Since 2003, PEO Soldier has fielded CCE to over one million 
Soldiers (Richards et al., 2013, p.3). There is an immense opportunity to leverage lessons 
learned from legacy RFI operations when establishing guidelines to DEB standard 
operating procedures. Additionally, PM SPIE has the opportunity to gain knowledge and 
leverage lessons learned from the Life-Cycle Management community. For example, 
CMO/OCIE and ICCE operations all have a high volume long-term storage aspect. 
Reviewing lessons learned, DEB stakeholders may capitalize on improved efficiencies in 
storage, inventory and fielding operations. . 
Executive Priorities: In February 2017, President Trump submitted a National 
Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-1), which states, “the Secretary shall assess 
readiness conditions...modernization…and…improve readiness conditions” (DOA, 
2016, p. 1). Additionally, CSA General Milley’s states on 1 September 2015: 
We must ensure the Army remains ready as the world’s premier combat 
force. Readiness for ground combat is-and will remain the Army’s #1 
priority.  We will always be ready to fight today, and we will always 
prepare to fight tomorrow.  Our most valued asset, indeed, the nation’s 
most valued asset, are our Soldiers and our solemn commitment must 
always be to never send them into harm’s way untrained, poorly led, 
undermanned, or with less than the best equipment we can provide. 
Readiness is #1, and there is no other #1. (Milley, 2015, para. 4)  
Both statements are from the highest levels of executive authority and clearly show that 
readiness is currently a priority. If for no other reason other than the aforementioned, 
there exists an enormous opportunity for DEB implementation.  
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Configuration Scalability: If quantity of equipment becomes an issue, the 
amount of CCE stored for DEB readiness is scalable to senior leadership requirements. If 
the office of the United States Army chief of staff (G8) feels the quantity of equipment 
exceeds funding capacity desired, there exists an opportunity to scale down the DEB 
inventory to supportable levels. 
Hub and Spoke Logistics: DEB centrally stages CCE in a single location and 
distributes to necessary deployer fielding locations as required. The warehouse in 
Lansing, MI, may not be the optimal location for hub and spoke logistics due to its 
location. To minimize transit times, reducing the distance between the warehouse hub 
and fielding site spokes is vital. Through relocation of the distribution warehouse hub, an 
opportunity to reduce the lag time to fielding events would exist.  
Incremental Force Modernization: As DEB modernizes CCE components for 
staging, phased-out equipment may be removed from the warehouse and fielded to 
operational Army units. Life cycle command planners can then create a phased-out 
fielding schedule, based on individual unit requirements, once the DEB is implemented. 
This provides an opportunity for the incremental modernization of a unit’s legacy items. 
4. Threats 
Managerial Oversight: Managerial Oversight is a concern. Highlighting the 
appropriate community to manage the DEB is vital. In the planned format, PEO Soldier, 
an Acquisition community organization, is tasked to perform DEB operations. The 
concern is that the Life Cycle community manages long-term storage and non-contingent 
OCIE fielding processes. The Life Cycle Community may be concerned that another 
community is performing their function. This could easily be perceived as an inability of 
the Life Cycle Command to do their job. Higher Army Leadership may not like other 
Agencies assuming their duties and responsibilities. Community stovepipe mentalities to 
maintain legacy programs under current doctrine is a threat. 
Funding and Appropriation: Administration priorities and the willingness to 
fund programs have a direct relationship. Programs live and die through executive 
support or the lack thereof. The readiness DEB buys may become less desirable to 
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another Administration’s priorities. Therefore, a priority today may not be a priority for 
tomorrow. 
G8’s mission of managing finite fiscal resources on prioritized requirements and 
willingness to spend is a threat tied directly to the DEB.  
RFI Continuation: If Contingency operations persist, RFI continues at elevated 
intensity. In this state, non-contingent readiness is made irrelevant. Therefore, the DEB 
does not create readiness and is unnecessary. 
C. COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
In this section, we quantitatively compare two non-contingent states. The first 
state is a condition of low-intensity RFI with the deployer equipment bundle, labeled 
“DEB.” The second state, labeled “status quo,” reflects a low-intensity RFI, CIF fielding 
operations, and no DEB. To do this, we first identify evaluation variable criteria for 
assessment derived from elements of the SWOT assessment. Evaluation criteria are 
chosen based on importance and their ability to discriminate one state against the other 
(see Table 14).  
Second, we create performance scores for the evaluation factors where (1) 
represents the higher performance level and (2) represents the lower performance level 








Table 14.    Evaluation Factors, Definitions, and Performance. 
Source: Richards et al. (2013, p. 14). 
 
 
 When then applying performance scores to each evaluation factor for the DEB 
and Status Quo, we determine that first deployer combat readiness receives a score of (1) 
for the DEB and (2) for status quo. For cost & funding, we determine that the DEB state 
receives a score of (1) and the status quo receives a score of (2). For industrial base, we 
determine that the DEB state receives a score of (1) and the status quo receives a score of 
(2). For management & executability, we determine that the status quo state receives a 
score of one (1) and the DEB receives a score of (2). For aversion to change, we 
determine that the status quo receives a score of (1) and the DEB receives a score of (2).   
Third, we applied weighting to the observed evaluation factors with the intent of 
highlighting the relative importance of first deployer combat readiness over the other 
relevant factor criteria. The assigned weights are a subjective assessment of the author’s 
perspectives (see Figure 21). 
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Table 15.   Evaluation Factor Weights and Assessment 
 
 
Next, we sum the observed performance scores as a method of obtaining the raw 
unweighted score for a baseline comparative analysis. The raw score formula is as such: 
 
Factor (F)1 + F2 + F3 + F4 + F5 = Raw Score.   
 
Finally, we multiply the observed performance scores against the relative weight 
of importance for each evaluation factor to determine overall weighted score. The 
weighted score formula is as such:  
 
F1 ∗  Weight of Importance (WOI)1 +  F2 ∗ WOI2 + F3 ∗ WOI3 + F4 ∗ WOI4 + F5
∗ WOI5 =  Weighted Score  
 
For a comparative sensitivity analysis, we conducted a raw score unweighted 
baseline assessment to determine the unweighted score for each state based off the 
metrics described in the raw score and weighted score formula. The sensitivity analysis 
illustrates a score where DEB operations produces an unweighted score of (7) and the 
status quo produces an unweighted score of (8). From an unweighted perspective, the 
DEB scores the lower value of the two states on the sensitivity in analysis Figure 21. 
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Figure 21.  Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Unweighted Evaluation Factors 
Next, we applied the prescribed weighing critera referenced in Figure 22, to the 
sensitivity analysis as a method of determining the effect of placing weights on the 
overall score. The sensitivity analysis illustrates a score highlighting that DEB operations 
produces a weighted score of (8) and the status quo produces a weighted score of (10). 
From a weighted perspective, the DEB again scores the lower value of the two states on 
the sensitivity analysis in Figure 22. We observe that once the weight of importance is 








Figure 22.  Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted Evaluation Factors 
Finaly, we adjust the weighing critera to the sensitivity analysis as a method of 
determining what it would take to change the outcome of the sensitivity analysis so that 
status quo reveives a lower more desirable value. In order to produce a lower value, we 
change the first deployer combat readiness from a (1) to a (2). We then change both 
management & executability and aversion to change from a one (1) to a (2). We 
determine that both cost & funding and the industrial base would remain unchanged. 
According to Richards et al. 2013 CBA, the DEB is cheaper than status quo. Therefore, 
the weight of importance for cost & funding remains unchanged. Additionally, we 
understand that the DEB provides a warmer industrial base than the status quo due to the 
production requirements it places on commercial industry. Therefore, the weight of 
importance for industrial base remains unchanged.   
For status quo to receive a lower score than the DEB, the weights of management 
& executability and aversion to change are increased to (2) and the relative weight of first 
deployer combat readiness is reduced to (1). By changing the relative importance of the 
weighting factors, the sensitivity analysis produces a score where DEB operations 
receives a weighted score of (11) and the status quo receives a weighted score of (10). 
From a weighted perspective, the status quo scores the lower value of the two states of 
the sensitivity analysis in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.  Alternate Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of 
Weighted Evaluation Factors 
Until now, subjective observations have been applied; in Chapter V we will 
interpret the differences from the analysis to draw conclusions to identify challenges and 








V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY 
The DEB is a storage and outfitting concept and designed to provide First 
Deployer readiness with the most up-to-date CCE upon declaration of the next major 
contingency. DEB stores a specified number of BCTs of CCE in a non-contingent 
environment. Furthermore, DEB allows the industrial base to ramp-up production in an 
expedited manner which translates into sustained procurement and fielding readiness for 
follow-on Force deployments. As the world exists currently, the only Army OMA-funded 
baseline program that provides the most modern CCE for first deployers in a non-
contingent environment is the program that supports the GRF. The limitation with this 
program is that it does not meet the capability gap to rapidly field more than one BCT. 
The proactive readiness DEB has the ability to create remains unachieved. This project 
set out to understand why. To answer the primary research question of identifying the 
challenges and barriers to acceptance of the DEB, we researched OCIE, ICCE, APS and 
RFI operations to gain insight from similar processes. We found the following challenges 
and barriers to acceptance of the DEB:  
• Ignorance to a new concept 




When new concepts are introduced into an organization, buy-in is necessary for 
the concept to be received and accepted. When members of an organization do not 
understand the principles of the new concept due to simple ignorance or the intricacies of 
its structure, the willingness to accept the concept degrade.   
Aversion to change is a naturally occurring behavior in humanity.  This aversion 
is magnified within type-A organizations whose policies and practices were refined and 
established over generations.  Often in those type-A organizations, the phrase “if it is not 
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broken, do not fix it” is voiced.  Change generates a certain amount of undesirable 
friction and uncertainty.   
Army culture is strong and diverse.  The lifecycle management and acquisition 
communities each have their own cultures and traditionally, are vastly different from one 
another. The DEB requires a specific measure of readiness that may be not be 
acknowledged by necessary stakeholders. DEB success requires comprehensive external 
stakeholder support. The potential for a clash of cultures within external stakeholder 
communities is high, especially when each stakeholder has differing priorities.  
In horizontal networks, stakeholders operate with independent objectives 
contributing to the same end goal.  When separate communities have differing priorities, 
those priorities often are not aligned with one another and clash.  When readiness is the 
priority, trusting independent stakeholders to behave in mutually supporting ways is 
paramount to achieving that goal.  
Then, we performed DOTmLPF, SWOT, quantitative and qualitative analyses to 
determine if answers existed to the following secondary research questions: 
1. What is the Army’s legacy operation for the procurement, storage and 
issuing of OCIE materiel? What is the Army’s desired CCE readiness 
level? 
PEO Soldier has an acquisition objective (AO) or procurement objective (PO) for 
each program. After the AO and/or PO is met, the program transfers from the 
PM/Acquisition community to the Life Cycle Manager (or Sustainment command) to buy 
more items and conduct life-cycle management operations, including storage and issuing 
activities at/from the CIF. 
To address the Army’s desired level of readiness, the 45th President of the United 
States calls for improved readiness. The CSA of the Army’s number one priority is 
readiness. Therefore, the desired level sought is relatively higher than present levels. 
Implementing the DEB concept is one way the Army can improve readiness. The DEB 
offers a proactive readiness capability to first deployers through its staging of large 
quantities of FR uniforms (both ACUs and extreme cold weather clothing system 
 73 
[ECWCS]) and PPE items. This type of readiness does not presently exist beyond GRF 
capabilities.  
2. Using comparative analysis, what is the USMC organizational clothing 
equivalencies operation? Why does the Army pre-position heavy 
equipment and not FR ACU and CCE items? 
Our research determines similarities and differences of the DEB concept to both 
the USMC’s ICCE operation and the Army’s APS operation. The USMC utilizes a 
centralized logistics management concept for ICCE operations. This construct of total 
life-cycle management is nearly identical to the Army’s life-cycle management 
operations. The USMC outfits the total force at time of initial issue (except FR uniforms). 
If the Army designated a scalable amount of additional dedicated first deployer BCTs, 
they could leverage a concept similar to the USMC fielding operations. To do this, DEB 
would require programmed baseline budget funding, similar to the USMC. Per  
ATP 3-35.1, Army Pre-Positioned Operations regulation, FR uniforms and CCE items are 
not pre-positioned due to excessive cost, constrained availability, and a pilferable nature 
(DOA, 2015, p. 1-4). APS Operations does not provide DEB the ability to leverage best 
practices due to the dissimilarity of programs. 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the DEB concept? How 
does the DEB affect Commercial Industry’s ability to ramp-up to full-rate 
production?  
The greatest advantage of the DEB concept is that it fills a capability gap for CCE 
materiel readiness in a non-contingent environment. DEB keeps the industrial base warm, 
significantly decreasing the amount of time required for the commercial industry to reach 
full-capacity production upon declaration of a major contingency. The greatest 
disadvantage of the DEB concept is that it is only needed for a non-contingent 
environment. If, however, the United States fails to transition to a non-contingent state, a 
sustained RFI operation will supersede a DEB concept requirement. If contingency 
operations continue, OCO funding would continue to provide resources for the RFI to 
procure, manage, and field FR uniforms and PPE materiel that the DEB would otherwise 
stage. In a contingent OCO-funded operational environment, OMA baseline funding will 
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not be used for DEB, thus deeming it irrelevant. Therefore, the willingness to pay for an 
unneeded capability is not-existent. 
To address DEB’s effect on Industry’s ability to ramp-up, we reviewed the rate at 
which Industry is capable of reaching full-production capacity, a rate of 3 BCTs per 
month, in both DEB and status quo environments. In a DEB state, Industry is capable of 
ramping-up 90 days faster than in a status quo alternative. Our research determines that 
the DEB concept is optimal when the commercial industry is not producing large 
quantities of CCE materiel. Additionally, the DEB concept allows up to 21 BCTs the 
ability to deploy with the most modern CCE within nine (9) months after declaration of 
contingency, compared to 17 months in an environment without the DEB, FR uniforms 
and a warm sustaining base (PM SPIE, 2013). 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the two evaluation factors where status quo outscores DEB operations, 
we determine the DEB’s greatest challenges and barriers to acceptance to be aversion to 
change, ignorance to new concept, culture, and trust. Human nature generally has an 
aversion to change. Until change is understood and embraced, stakeholders will fail to 
recognize the value of new information. Change in the Army requires shifting away from 
legacy programs and embracing new paradigms of thought. The DEB concept is a 
fundamental change in the way Army conducts OCIE management on a large scale.  
Currently, the GRF brigade conducts a scaled down version of the DEB concept 
displaying that the DEB concept already works on a smaller scale.  Embracing large-scale 
change adopted from small scale operations requires buy-in of new concepts, trust, time, 
and program discipline.  Additionally, the Army could use the USMC ICE concept for 
operations as medium-sized DEB concept for storing and staging first deployer FR 
uniforms and PPE.   
Horizontal network relationship of key stakeholders all have varying cultures. 
When different cultures converge, trust become an issue. Specifically relating to the 
Army, stakeholders of separate communities have differing priorities, objectives and 
definitions of how readiness is achieved. Significance to one community may be 
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insignificant to another. Until divergent thoughts from the various communities that 
handle OCIE co-mingle, cultural and trust issues may persist. 
Logistics is not an issue. Army already has the tangible capacity to seamlessly 
integrate storage, monetary, and transportation requirements. The challenge of changing 
hearts and minds is the crux of the issue. If stakeholder goals are aligned and mutually 
endorsed to bring together disparate communities, DEB would create a unique 
opportunity to provide readiness for the Army’s most important resource, the individual 
warfighter. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
Due to the scope and limitations of our research, we recommend the following 
topic and sub-topics for future research and analysis. The life cycle management 
community traditionally manages organizational clothing and individual equipment. We 
feel that there is potential to eliminate stated challenges and barriers to acceptance 
through placement of the DEB concept within the LCMC community. Specific areas of 
interest should include: If the LCMC community managed the DEB, how would 
readiness and life-cycle costs be affected? What are the tangible and intangible costs 
associated with this change in management? Lastly, what insights are gleaned from 
converting DEB operations ownership from the vertically integrated PEO Soldier 
organization to a horizontal network of life cycle management organizations? 
Additionally, we feel that there exists an opportunity to leverage the scalability of 
the DEB inventory potentially reducing other challenges or barriers to acceptance due to 
stakeholder sensitivity. Specific areas of interest should include: The DEB currently 
specifies a quantity of support for a specified number of BCTs to support two regional 
conflicts. Is that number of BCTs the optimal number or should it be a different quantity? 
Specifically, what is the appropriate quantity of equipment necessary to support DEB 
operations?   
Lastly, the USMC currently issues required ICE to their warfighters immediately 
upon arrival to individual installations and FR uniforms right before deployment. Specific 
areas of interest should include: whether there exists an opportunity for the USMC to 
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adopt a DEB concept or is the size of their force too small to warrant implementing such 
a program?  
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